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In recent decades, the use of conditionality backed by benefit sanctions for those claiming 
unemployment and related benefits has become widespread in the social security systems of high-
income countries. Critics argue that sanctions may be ineffective in bringing people back to 
employment or indeed harmful in a range of ways. Existing reviews largely assess the labour market 
impacts of sanctions but our understanding of the wider impacts is more limited. We report results 
from a scoping review of the international quantitative research evidence on both labour market 
and wider impacts of benefit sanctions. Following systematic search and screening, we extract data 
for 94 studies reporting on 253 outcome measures. We provide a narrative summary, paying 
attention to the ability of the studies to support causal inference. Despite variation in the evidence 
base and study designs, we found that labour market studies, covering two thirds of our sample, 
consistently reported positive impacts for employment but negative impacts for job quality and 
stability in the longer term, along with increased transitions to non-employment or economic 
inactivity. Although largely relying on non-experimental designs, wider-outcome studies reported 
significant associations with increased material hardship and health problems. There was also some 
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Over the last three decades, social security systems in high-income countries have increasingly been 
marked by a tightening of eligibility requirements and the introduction of more conditions linked to 
the receipt of unemployment and related benefits (Langenbucher, 2015; Immervoll and Knotz, 
2018). Conditions are enforced through the imposition of sanctions, which are a temporary 
reduction or interruption of benefit payments (that in some cases can be permanent) (Griggs and 
Evans, 2010). Introduced as part of a broader shift towards active labour market policies, sanctions 
are intended to promote compliance with conditions on work search or similar activities, and hence 
speed the return to employment (Eichhorst et al., 2008; Bonoli, 2010). Greater intensity in sanctions 
has been accompanied by an extension in the coverage of sanctions in some cases, so sanctions 
increasingly affect not only those unemployed but also those economically inactive or in low-paid 
work, and groups including lone parents and even those with a chronic illness or disability 
(Baumberg Geiger, 2017; Dwyer and Wright, 2014; McHale et al., 2020).  
 
The impacts of sanction regimes are contested, but systematic reviews of the evidence are lacking. 
On the labour market side, there are numerous reviews and meta-analyses of evidence on active 
labour market policies. However, most of these have methodological limitations, including poor 
reporting of methods and lack of detail or non-systematic approaches to study identification and 
inclusion (e.g. McVicar, 2020). Reviews of active labour market policies shed little light on the impact 
of sanctions as they employ a typology of policies which places sanctioning in the category of job-
search assistance (e.g. Kluve et al., 2010; Filges et al., 2015; Crepon and van den Berg, 2016; Card et 
al., 2018; Vooren et al., 2019; Yevati et al., 2019). Very broadly, these studies suggest significant 
effects in terms of an increase in rates of both benefit exit and job entry in the short term. Others 
suggest that, in the longer term, there may be higher risks of economic inactivity or a return to 
unemployment benefits, and worsening job quality. 
 
The literature on wider impacts is much smaller and has never been systematically identified or 
reviewed to our knowledge. We are aware of one scoping review of the health effects of 
participation in active labour market programmes, but it too includes sanctions within a wider 
category of job-search assistance (Puig-Barrachina et al., 2019). One review of UK welfare reform 
studies includes quantitative and qualitative evidence on the wider impacts of sanctions, finding 
negative effects on a range of health and social outcomes (Hudson-Sharp et al., 2018). Individual 
studies frequently stress the negative consequences of sanctions for areas including financial stress 
and debt cumulation, adverse physical and mental health outcomes, hunger and utility cut-offs, 
increased reliance on food banks, survival crime, rent arrears, eviction and homelessness. Benefit 
sanctions are also reported to have negative repercussions for family relations, including impacts on 
the well-being of children, their cognitive development and education (Griggs and Evans, 2010; 
Watts et al., 2014; Dwyer, 2018; Webster, 2019). Further criticism of sanctions policies come from 
studies which have shown that they lead to the diversion of limited resources by key public services 
to address these consequences (National Audit Office, 2016). Adverse resource impacts have also 
been highlighted by employers, who must deal with the large numbers of unsuitable job applications 
that arise from mandatory job-search requirements (Ingold, 2020). 
 
In this study, we therefore provide a new assessment of the impact of sanctions by conducting a 
scoping review of the quantitative research evidence covering labour market and wider impacts. A 
scoping review involves the application of systematic search, screening and data extraction 
processes to identify and summarise evidence from the body of work in a given field. This provides 




The focus on quantitative evidence is not to deny the enormous importance of qualitative evidence 
in the study of welfare reform in general or the impact of conditionality or sanctions in particular. A 
great deal of that work informs the present review, both in terms of overall framing and in terms of 
thinking about the causal pathways or mechanisms by which sanctions produce outcomes or 
impacts. We draw on that wider literature in summarising our understanding of the latter. We have 
chosen to focus on quantitative studies, however, because they provide some measure of the 
direction and scale of impacts using the conventions of statistical methods, and offer a basis for 
comparison and synthesis (although we do not seek to provide a full meta-analysis here). Even with 
this limitation, the scale of this review is substantial.  
 
Within the quantitative literature, we pay particular attention to research design, using the familiar 
concept of the hierarchy of evidence which runs from purely observational studies through those 
with quasi-experimental designs to randomised experiments (Guyatt et al., 1995). Unlike purely 
observational studies, the latter can provide more convincing evidence that observed relationships 
are causal, i.e. that it is sanction events which lead to particular outcomes rather than other factors. 
The idea of an evidence hierarchy has been challenged particularly by those who emphasise external 
validity or generalisability, and hence the need to build knowledge about causal mechanisms and the 
role of context in shaping outcomes (Deaton, 2010). Since our focus here is primarily on internal 
validity or assessing whether a particular programme had a particular outcome, the hierarchy 
remains a valid and useful framework (Imbens, 2010).  
 
In this study, the primary focus is the working-age population in receipt of out-of-work benefits, such 
as unemployment-related or other means-tested benefits, which are subject to job-search and 
related requirements. By applying a rigorous systematic search strategy, study selection and data 
extraction process, we aim to provide a synthesis of the quantitative evidence base by capturing 
characteristics such as temporal and/or geographic spread, target population, research study design, 
outcomes assessed and results. We address the following research questions:  
 
1. What is the scale and nature of the quantitative evidence base on the impacts of benefit 
sanctions, for both labour market and wider outcomes? How does this vary in terms of the study 
designs used? 
2. What does the quantitative evidence suggest are the impacts of sanctions for both labour 
market and wider outcomes? Do conclusions vary depending on study design? 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the international 
contexts for sanction policies. Section 3 offers an overview of the various mechanisms for 
understanding the impacts of benefit sanctions. Section 4 presents the research design typology or 
hierarchy. Section 5 describes the methods used in the scoping review to identify and assess the 
evidence base. Results are presented in section 6 which examines the scale and nature of the 
quantitative evidence, and section 7 which summarises the results from this work in relation to 
labour market and wider outcomes. The article concludes with a summary (section 8) and reflections 




2. Contexts for sanction policies 
 
While benefit sanctions have long been a feature of some social security systems, in recent decades 
their severity in terms of value, duration, and requirements has markedly increased. Beginning with 
the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity and Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in the USA (1996), 
which escalated sanctioning for lone parents in receipt of means-tested benefits, many high-income 
countries have implemented increasingly stringent sanctioning regimes. These reforms were 
underpinned initially by arguments about work disincentives and benefit dependency produced by 
‘passive’ welfare systems (Grubb, 2000), but given additional impetus by austerity policies 
introduced after the Global Financial Crisis (Moffitt, 2014). Such policies have focused primarily on 
supply-side factors, paying little attention to the impact of demand on individuals’ ability to find 
employment (Blank, 2002). Simultaneously, the labour market in many high-income countries has 
become increasingly flexibilised and precarious for many workers (Barbieri, 2009; Weber et al., 
2020). 
 
There are important contextual differences between sanction regimes in high-income countries 
which are likely to influence the impacts of sanctioning, and which have a bearing on interpretation 
of the evidence as a result. In Nordic countries and some countries in Continental Europe, the 
majority of studies are of interventions aimed at the general unemployed population. In countries 
such as Germany or the Netherlands, unemployment benefits are largely insurance- or 
contributions-based. As they are related to earnings, they are also relatively generous. These 
benefits represent the first tier of the safety net and, if entitlement ceases due to time limits or 
sanctions, claimants can access a second tier of the safety net in the form of residualised social 
assistance. Thus, where European studies report that sanctions lead to labour market exit, it does 
not necessarily mean exit to no job and no benefit income. By contrast, in countries such as the USA, 
the UK or Australia, there is only one tier of the safety net, and the value of payments is lower (Esser 
et al., 2013; Immervoll and Knotz, 2018; OECD, 2018). Receiving a sanction can mean that claimants 
have no other source of cash income, although repayable hardship loans may be available in the UK 
and some non-cash benefits may be available in the US. These differences have implications for the 
interpretation of evidence from differing national contexts.  
 
3. The mechanisms of sanction impacts 
 
Griggs and Evans (2010) distinguish between take-up, threat, warning and imposition effects of 
sanctions. Take-up effects occur by discouraging eligible individuals from applying for benefits in the 
first place. Threat effects refer to the general pressure on claimants to comply with requirements, 
whilst warning effects result from formal sanction warnings, where such provisions exist. Imposition 
effects occur when an applied sanction results in a loss of benefit income. The majority of studies 
considered in this review capture imposition effects, reflecting the limited use of warnings 
internationally and the fact that it is more straightforward to estimate the impact of sanctions that 
have actually been applied. Studies that measure existing or changing rules, however, arguably 
capture a combined form of sanction effect. Attempts have also been made to estimate threat 
effects separately from the influence of the job-search requirements that they underpin. 
 
The economic literature utilises job-search theory to understand labour market labour market 
impacts of sanction policies (Abbring et al., 2005). Job-search theory implies that both the threat and 
the imposition of sanctions will increase exits to employment, by reducing the relative value of 
continuing to claim unemployment benefits. Sanctions increase the monetary and non-monetary 
costs of being unemployed, leading individuals to increase job-search efforts and to lower wage 
expectations, thereby increasing their likelihood of finding employment. Formal warnings exert a 
similar effect by signalling that a sanction is likely to be enforced (Lalive et al., 2005). Importantly, 
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however, actual effects are contingent on benefit design. Threat effects, for example, will be 
ineffective if they simply lead to a direct substitution of formal for informal job-search methods (van 
den Berg and van der Klaauw, 2006). 
 
Job-search theory provides inconclusive predictions with regard to post-unemployment outcomes 
such as job quality (Arni et al., 2013; van den Berg and Vikström, 2014). Shorter unemployment 
durations may help individuals secure work at their pre-unemployment occupational level, which 
might be expected to have beneficial implications for initial wages, future earnings and job stability. 
However, sanctions may encourage individuals to lower their wage expectations to find work, 
therefore increasing the likelihood that they will accept lower quality jobs than they would 
otherwise secure. Arni et al. (2013) also argue that sanctions policy could increase transitions out of 
the labour force itself, though it is unclear how prevalent this effect is expected to be or how long it 
might last.  
 
Job-search theory implies that more severe sanctions will have larger threat and imposition effects 
(Hofmann, 2012). The availability of substitute income sources, such as access to alternative 
benefits, hardship payments or informal assistance from friends and family, will therefore also be 
influential. Critics emphasise that unemployed individuals require adequate financial resources to 
conduct effective job search, and therefore contest the expected link between sanctions and 
positive employment outcomes (Webster, 2019). 
 
Sanctions may also impact on a wide range of areas including health, debt and financial problems, 
homelessness or crime (Griggs and Evans, 2010; Watts et al., 2014). In part, these arise through the 
immediate financial impacts of sanctions. These can be expected to initiate or worsen pre-existing 
debts, rent and utility arrears and severely restrict expenditure on basic necessities, such as food, 
heating and electricity (Dwyer, 2018). However, non-financial routes are also argued to be 
important. For health, for example, psychosocial aspects have been highlighted as sanctions may 
heighten stress and anxiety from negative social attitudes and stigma, not just material hardship. 
One recent review which considered the impacts of reductions in social security across high-income 
countries found negative effects for mental health outcomes (Simpson et al., 2021). Such effects 
may persist in the longer term, due to the potential adverse impact of sanctions on job quality and 
labour force attachment. 
 
Impacts on sanctioned adults may also affect children in the household (Griggs and Evans, 2010). 
Both material and psychosocial pathways are again relevant. For example, sanctions can increase 
parental stress which may affect parent-child relationships and child development, while lack of 
funds for school-related costs such as food and transport can lead to reduced school attendance 
(Peters and Joyce, 2006; Dwyer, 2018). If sanctions are associated with longer-term adverse labour 
market consequences for adults, wider research indicates that children are likely to be adversely 
affected. A recent systematic review finds that income has a causal influence on children’s 
outcomes, including their health, cognitive, social and behavioural development (Cooper and 
Stewart, 2020). Detrimental impacts are driven directly by restricted financial resources, which 
affects housing and diet, but also by the associated financial stress and its impact on parenting 




4. Study design typology 
 
There is a widely-recognised classification of research designs into a hierarchy with three broad 
types, based on their value for the identification of causal relationships: non-experimental, quasi-
experimental and experimental designs (Murnane and Willett, 2010; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). At 
times in the analysis, we further divide the first group into three sub-categories reflecting their 
relative ability to identify causal relationships (Table 1). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
In the non-experimental group, Type 1a comprises descriptive studies based on bivariate analysis 
and studies based on simple multivariable regression techniques, such as linear regression and 
logistic/probit models. In these models, outcomes are generally compared across exposed and 
unexposed individuals while covariate adjustment is used to account for potential confounders that 
may be associated with both the exposure and the outcome of interest. Conventional regression 
analyses lie at the lowest end of the continuum as they only control for observed variations. They 
can only make weak claims that observed relationships indicate causal effects since these may be 
biased by unmeasured confounders. Type 1b includes more advanced regression-based approaches 
which, depending on how they are implemented, can control for some unmeasured confounding 
and hence provide estimates which are likely to be closer to causal effects. These include survival 
models, and fixed- and random-effects models. Type 1c covers designs based on matching 
techniques relying on covariate adjustment to estimate a propensity score which is the probability of 
an individual being assigned to or receiving an intervention. Estimates may still be affected by 
residual and unmeasured confounding, as with other regression techniques.  
 
We note that, in Type 1b, we include studies based on a timing-of-events approach (Abbring and van 
den Berg, 2003) using mixed proportional hazards models. These can be considered a form of 
competing risks models allowing for potential unobservable confounding, so could plausibly be 
included with the quasi-experimental designs. For now, we group them here due to their 
commonalities with other approaches in the group. 
 
Type 2 covers quasi-experimental approaches and is quite heterogeneous. Difference-in-differences 
models rely on ‘naturally occurring’ policy variations allocating people to treatment ‘as if at random’. 
They combine comparisons of before and after exposure with comparisons between exposed and 
unexposed individuals. If interrupted time series include data on an unexposed comparison group, 
they can be considered a form of difference-in-differences model, where the randomisation 
mechanism is defined by the calendar time. For both difference-in-differences and interrupted time 
series, stronger assumptions are needed to increase their credibility, due for example to changes 
over time occurring independently of the exposure and affecting exposed and unexposed groups 
unequally, or to group composition changing over time. 
 
Type 2 also includes regression discontinuity models which rely on a cut-off or threshold rule on a 
continuous assignment variable allocating individuals to the treatment or a comparison group. The 
model compares those just above and below the threshold, looking for corresponding discontinuity 
in outcomes to estimate the impact of the intervention. Compared to difference-in-differences, 
regression discontinuity models may offer stronger causal inferences but limited to a restricted 
region around the threshold (Bärnighausen et al., 2017). Instrumental variables models rely on 
finding an exogenous factor which is related to the intervention but not otherwise related to the 




With all the approaches included in Type 2, the weakness is that the underlying assumptions about 
‘as if random’ allocation to treatment or independence of confounders are impossible to prove. 
Although various kinds of evidence can strengthen claims in this regard, challenges to the 
interpretation and attribution of causal effects may remain. 
 
At the highest end of the hierarchy, lies Type 3 which covers randomised controlled trials. By relying 
on strict random assignment to allocate individuals to treatment and control groups, researchers can 
legitimately claim to have eliminated confounding due to unobserved variations so that differences 
in outcomes have a clear causal interpretation. Even in this case, issues may still remain with the 
practical application or ensuring compliance with the design (Deaton, 2010). There can be issues 
with selective attrition after allocation to treatment which need to be clearly accounted for and, 
with experiments in ‘real world’ settings, there can be issues with ensuring people adhere to the 





We draw on the seminal framework by Arksey and O’Malley (2005) and more recent advances 
(Levac et al. 2010; Peters et al. 2015) to conduct a systematic search and screening of quantitative 
studies reporting the labour market and the wider impacts of sanctions in high-income countries. 
We developed a protocol for our scoping review (Pattaro et al. 2019) following, where possible, the 
Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) guidelines (Tricco et 
al. 2018). These ensure that a rigorous, consistent and transparent process is followed. Scoping 
reviews often aim to map the existing evidence on a particular topic, and may inform subsequent 
systematic reviews, by providing the baseline knowledge required to establish whether a full 
systematic review of the evidence is warranted. 
 
Search strategy 
In consultation with an Information Scientist, we iteratively developed an extensive search strategy 
including many subject headings, keywords, and synonyms for benefit sanctions. Between March 
and June 2019, we conducted initial electronic searches of eight major social and health sciences 
bibliographic databases: ASSIA, British Education Index, EconLit, ERIC, PsycINFO, MEDLINE, Scopus, 
SocINDEX. Results are summarised in Table A1, with full details of the search strategies in Table A2 
(both in the online appendix). We also hand searched relevant research and policy organisations’ 
websites (e.g. Institute of Labor Economics - IZA, National Bureau of Economic Research - NBER, 
Research Papers in Economics – RePEc, Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education 
Policy - IFAU, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development – OECD, and International 
Labour Organization - ILO). The combined results of the searches were imported into Endnote and 
deduplicated. 
 
Inclusion criteria and study selection process 
The studies for this review were selected using the following inclusion criteria: 
 
1. Targeting working-age recipients of unemployment-related and other means-tested benefits 
in high-income countries; 
2. Investigating sanctions applied to these benefits for failure to comply with job-search and 
other requirements;  
3. Quantitative research studies based on either experimental, quasi-experimental or non-
experimental designs; 
4. Published in the English language; 
5. Published between 1990 and 2019. 
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Four authors (SP, NB, EW and MG) screened and extracted data from the studies included in the 
review. An overview of the selection process is shown in Figure 1. The electronic database searches 
yielded 9629 records. These were combined with 404 records identified by the hand searches. 
Deduplication yielded a total of 7573 records. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Following initial screening to assess whether studies appeared to meet our eligibility criteria, 6387 
(84%) records were excluded due to lack of relevance, publication date, or language. To ensure the 
reliability of initial screening, 10% of retrieved records were checked by SP and EW. The 
disagreement rate was 2% (n=19); discrepancies were resolved through discussion with a third 
researcher (MG). 
 
Initial screening yielded 1186 full-text articles for a second stage of screening, which excluded a 
further 1092 studies. Of these, a large group (n=603; 55%) were not focused on sanctions, including 
studies of welfare leavers’ outcomes and the effects of other welfare reforms such as time limit 
policies or job-search interventions not directly reporting sanction impacts. Working papers already 
in our database that were subsequently published as a journal article were also excluded. Eighteen 
% of studies (197) were excluded due to study design, including narrative policy analysis papers, 
commentaries, discussion pieces, general overviews, qualitative studies, theoretical papers and 
studies based on microsimulation modelling. 153 studies (14%) were excluded due to evaluating 
multiple simultaneous interventions or policies, precluding identification of the unique impact of 
sanctions. For example, some used period or policy dummy indicators to identify a set of welfare 
changes or combined sanctioned individuals with groups affected by other policies. A further 75 
studies (7%) reviewed a number of individual studies using a variety of methodologies from informal 
narrative review to systematic review. The remaining excluded studies (6%) comprised 28 articles 
which could not be accessed, 26 out-of-scope studies (published before January 1990, not in English 
or not from high-income countries) and 10 further duplicates. 
 
Following the second screening, SP and EW conducted an additional review of 118 studies (10% of 
the sample assessed for eligibility) with a disagreement rate of 21% (n = 25); discrepancies were 
discussed with MG. The overall discrepancy rate for both screening stages was 5% (n=44). 
 
The screening process identified 94 studies providing original evidence on the impact of benefit 
sanctions, on which data extraction and analysis were subsequently conducted. The sample 
comprises 59 studies (63%) reporting only labour market outcomes, 26 studies (28%) reporting 
wider outcomes only and 9 studies (9%) reporting both outcomes. Some tables therefore present 
statistics for 103 studies in total as nine are counted twice. Many studies report results for multiple 
outcomes; the total number of outcomes is 253.  
 
Data extraction 
A data extraction form was developed to record detailed information for the analytical sample. The 
form was pilot-tested on a randomly-selected study and subsequently refined on a larger number of 
studies. We gathered high-level characteristics such as type of outcome reported, population, 
national context, time period of the intervention and study design. We then extracted more detailed 
information on the magnitude, sign and statistical significance for the parameters estimated for the 
outcomes. We also extracted the time horizon of the results (short-, medium- or longer-term) and 
details on the exposure including the type of sanctions (whether full or partial) and related effect 
(for instance, whether an imposition or threat of sanctions), along with details on the study design. 
To ensure consistency of the data extraction phase, SP and EW conducted a review of the data 
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extraction forms compiled for 12 studies (13% of the analytical sample) and discrepancies were 
discussed (n=1; disagreement rate = 8%), without resorting to a third reviewer. 
 
Literature analysis and synthesis 
We conduct a descriptive analysis of the evidence base by exploring how this varies by main study 
characteristics. We present a synthesis of effects for eight labour market and eleven wider 
outcomes, each of which can be assessed by one or more measures as Figure 2 below records. 
 
In synthesising results, we combine two approaches. First, we report simple frequencies and 
percentages for relevant characteristics across the sample. Where possible, we provide these details 
at the highest level of aggregation, namely by broad categories of labour market and wider 
outcomes (n=94; de facto n=103, as 9 studies reported both labour market and wider outcomes). For 
the impact of sanctions on the outcomes we report the sign and significance of estimated 
parameters at a lower level of aggregation, that is for outcome measures (n=253; Figure 2 below). 
We extracted impact data for all reported outcomes, including any subgroups or further subdivisions 
of impacts reported in the original studies. However, for sake of simplicity, when summarising the 
data, we report the most prevalent results when these were recorded for multiple subgroups, time 
horizons or exposure categories. In doing this, we rely on the results foregrounded by the study 
authors where possible. We provide a narrative summary of the effects, and include comments and 
examples to clarify any mixed results emerging from the body of evidence.  
 
6. Scale and nature of the quantitative evidence 
 
In this section we address the first research question by providing an overview of the scale and 
nature of the quantitative evidence base. Table A3 in the online appendix includes additional details 
for the studies, ordered alphabetically and grouped by outcomes and study design. Details include 
information on the programme or intervention, outcome measures assessed and key outcome 
results. The references for the studies are reported in Table A4 in the online appendix. These are 
ordered using a sequential number which we report jointly with the reference in the text in the 
remainder of the article. 
 
Study contexts 
Table 2 provides an overview of the contexts and nature of the studies included in the scoping 
review, divided between labour market and wider outcomes (n=103, as studies covering both 
counted twice). In general, the labour market literature looks much more substantial. There are 
twice as many studies of labour market outcomes. They cover more of the potential sanction effects 
(e.g. threat effects), with a greater use of individual-level data and administrative sources likely to 
have larger scale. As Figure 3 shows, a larger proportion of these studies can support causal 
inference. 
 
For both labour market and wider outcomes, the large majority of studies cover the 1990s or 2000s 
with relatively few for the last decade but this may reflect the lag in the research process in part. By 
publication period, the labour market literature has the same volume in the last decade as the 
previous but the wider-outcome literature showed a sharp decline. The United States accounts for 
the largest share, with 52 percent of labour market and 86 percent of wider outcome studies. For 
the latter, it is notable that the entire evidence base identified by the scoping review comes from 
English-speaking countries, with the UK adding four studies and Australia one. This may in itself be 
one indication of the more severe impact of sanctions in these contexts, as noted in Section 2 above, 
and hence a greater urgency to produce evidence on these outcomes. By contrast, studies on labour 
market outcomes include twenty-two from Continental European countries and a further seven 
from Nordic countries. The Continental European studies are from Germany (n=10), Switzerland 
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(n=5), the Netherlands (n=4), Belgium (n=2) and Hungary (n=1). Among Nordic countries, Denmark 
has four studies, with Sweden, Norway and Finland one each. 
 
There is an almost-perfect correspondence between target population group and type of 
programme or intervention covered by the studies. These dimensions also largely overlap with 
geographical coverage. Studies reporting wider outcomes are primarily US studies of low-income 
families or lone parents largely in receipt of means-tested benefits in the form of ‘Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families’ (TANF) or its antecedent ‘Aid to Families with Dependent Children’ 
(AFDC). On the other hand, a conspicuous portion of studies reporting labour market outcomes, 
largely among European countries, focuses on unemployed people in receipt of either contribution-
based Unemployment Insurance (UI) or means-tested Unemployment Assistance (UA). Only one 
study, from the UK’s National Audit Office (2016 [61]) focused on people in receipt of disability 
benefits.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Looking at the remaining study characteristics, different profiles emerge depending on the outcomes 
being assessed. Nearly all studies on wider outcomes reported on imposition of sanctions (94%; 
n=33), either full sanctions (n=11) or not distinguishing full and partial sanctions (n=22). By contrast, 
among studies of labour market outcomes, a large share reported either an imposition or a threat of 
sanctions (85%, n=58), and there was a split between those examining full sanctions (n=29) and 
those looking at partial sanctions (n=16). For TANF benefits in the US, sanctions may extend beyond 
the portion of benefits attributable to the non-compliant household member to the benefits for the 
entire household, including children.  
 
Three quarters of studies of labour market outcomes used sanction indicators measured at an 
individual level (75%, n=51). Studies of wider outcomes were more evenly divided, relying on 
sanction indicators measured at both individual (51%, n=18) and area levels (49%, n=17). The latter 
included indicators measured at state, regional or local area level. Of these, approximately one third 
(n=6 and n=7, respectively) also employed area-level units of analysis. These are largely based on 
non-experimental designs and may suffer from additional problems related to ecological fallacies, 
whereby individual-level inferences are incorrectly derived from correlations observed at the area-
level, as recognised by some authors (e.g. Loopstra et al., 2015 [83]). 
 
While a significant proportion of the labour market studies use administrative data (57%; n=39), 
among studies on wider outcomes, data sources are more diverse, with survey data the most 
common source (43%; n=15), followed by linked administrative-survey data and administrative data 
(29%, n=10, and 26%, n=9, respectively). This may be linked to the fact that a larger proportion of 
non-labour market studies are based on non-experimental study designs in contrast with quasi- or 
experimental designs used more commonly among labour market studies.  
 
Outcomes  
Figure 2 summarises the specific outcomes examined along with selected measures used in each 
case. It shows the enormous diversity across the literature. In our review, we identified 253 
outcomes measures across the 94 studies. Of these, 163 (64%) related to the labour market. From 
these, we identified eight specific outcomes (Figure 2, top panel): employment; job stability; job 
quality; non-employment/economic inactivity in short- and long-term; benefits receipt in short- and 
long-term; and earnings/income. Within each of these outcomes, a range of measures might be 
used. With employment, for example, we identified 44 measures, mostly referring to either 
employment status or entry into employment. Job stability and quality were assessed through 25 
measures. These appeared in studies examining for example whether unemployed individuals 
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entered regular employment in the longer-term or transitioned to jobs which were better paid (e.g.: 
Hofmann, 2012 [16]; van den Berg and Vikström, 2014 [44]). Entry into non-employment or 
economic inactivity also included exits to an unknown destination. Nearly a quarter of labour 
market-related measures fall into this category (n=39) including a small number regarding long-term 
aspects of non-employment or economic inactivity. The remaining measures are equally divided in 
those relating to benefits and those relating to either earnings from employment or income. In our 
sample, we have a total of 27 measures (17%) regarding either re-entry into benefits or long-term 
persistence of benefit receipt and 28 measures (17%) regarding earnings from employment and/or 
other sources of income. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Among studies concerned with wider outcomes, we identify five broad groups: material hardship; 
health-related outcomes, covering health problems and access to health insurance; child outcomes, 
including well-being, maltreatment and education; demographic outcomes; and a group including 
vulnerable status, crime, compliance and other outcomes (Figure 2, bottom panel). Material 
hardship was covered by 35 measures (39%) assessed through measures including food insecurity, 
financial hardship, housing problems, or utility cut-offs, as well as impacts of material hardship on 
adult health or on children’s opportunities. In two studies, it was not possible to disaggregate the 
last two measures and we reported these as part of material hardship (Lindhorst and Mancoske, 
2006 [26]; Lindhorst, et al., 2000 [27]). Health problems and health insurance status were assessed 
through 18 measures (20%) for adults but also children. Additionally, we identified 21 measures 
(23%) for child outcomes including well-being, maltreatment and educational outcomes. Ten 
measures (11%) concerned demographic outcomes, including entry into marriage, cohabitation or 
female household headship. We identified one measure for vulnerable status and two measures for 
crime. Compliance was quantified through one measure where other outcomes pertained to social 
relationship problems (n=1) and risk-taking behaviour (n=1). 
 
While all labour market measures concerned working-age adults (of necessity), only half of the wider 
outcome studies focussed on adults (n=42), with one third looking at children (n=29) and a further 
fifth covering both adults and children (n=19). In terms of time horizons for outcomes, more than 
half of the wider outcome studies (n=46) looked at the short-term (i.e. within the first year following 
a sanction), whereas for labour market studies this was less than 40 percent (results not shown). 
 
Study design 
The distribution of the study designs is presented in Figure 3. The majority of studies across both 
labour market and wider outcomes rely on non-experimental designs (Types 1a-1c) but these make 
up a much larger proportion of the latter group. Very few wider outcome studies apply quasi-
experimental or experimental designs (n=12 outcomes measured). Instead the literature is 
dominated by Types 1a (n=47) or 1b (n=31). With labour market studies, almost a quarter are quasi-
experimental (n=33) or experimental (n=22).  
 




7. The impact of sanctions 
 
In this section we address the second research question by presenting a synthesis of the results of 
the impact of sanctions across labour market and wider outcomes. We also look at variations by 
study design. Figure 4 shows the number of times measures displayed a significant increase, 
significant decrease or no change for each outcome identified. Table 3 disaggregates these by the 
three main types of study design while the text refers to the finer categories of study design where 
relevant. 
 
Labour market outcomes 
With the larger labour market literature, a large proportion reported a positive impact of sanctions 
on employment outcomes (Figure 4, panel a). However, sanctions appear to be associated with 
adverse or null impacts on job quality in the longer term. Sanctions also seem to be associated with 
both a significant increase in exits from benefits to either non-employment or economic inactivity, 
and a significant decrease in benefit receipt. A large share of studies reported negative or null 
impacts on either earnings or income. 
 
Employment status and entry 
A total of 44 outcomes relating to employment status or entry into employment were reported. Of 
these, just over half (n=24; 55%) reported a positive association with the threat or imposition of 
sanctions, while 13 (30%) reported no impact, and 7 (16%) reported negative effects (Figure 4 and 
Table 3). The majority (n=30; 68%) were from non-experimental studies. Results from these were 
less likely to show an increase in employment (14 out of 30). The quasi-experimental and 
experimental studies were much more likely to do so (10 out of 14). 
 
For positive employment outcomes reported by non-experimental studies (n=14), the majority relied 
on the timing-of-events approach (n=11), covering mostly Continental European countries. As noted 
in Section 4 above, this is an approach which could plausibly be included with the quasi-
experimental category. Two studies from Germany (Müller and Steiner, 2008 [31]; Hohenleitner and 
Hillmann, 2019a [17]) and one from the US (Peck, 2007, [34]) used propensity score matching. 
Various methods were used by the quasi-experimental group, covering two studies from Belgium 
and Switzerland (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2007 [56]; Arni and Schiprowki, 2016 [53], respectively) and 
one from the UK (National Audit Office, 2016 [61]). By contrast, the experimental studies, relied on 
random assignment of study participants to intervention and control group. These were largely from 
the US, except from one study from Hungary (Micklewright and Nagy, 2010 [65]). Within the non-
experimental group, numerous studies mostly coming from the US also reported either a significant 
decrease or no change in employment outcomes following a sanction (n=16). While most of the 
studies reporting no change in employment outcomes relied on survival modelling or descriptive 
analysis (9 studies reporting a total of 11 outcomes), those reporting a significant decrease relied on 
conventional regression models (n=5). There are four studies among the quasi-experimental group 
which reported either no change or a significant decrease in employment outcomes, largely in the 
short-term. While the former are Continental European studies (Cockx and Dejemeppe, 2012 [57]; 
Arni and Schiprowki, 2016 [53]), the latter are from the UK (National Audit Office, 2016 [61]; Taulbut 
et al., 2018 [62]).  
 





Job stability and quality 
Fewer outcomes relating to job stability and quality were reported, mostly from non-experimental 
studies (Table 3, panel a, and Figure 5). Of 14 job stability outcomes, there were positive effects for 
6, no effect on 3, and 5 found that job stability decreased. Eleven job quality outcomes included one 
positive impact, 6 negative associations, and no effect in 4 cases. Between the two outcomes, the 
majority of effects were either negative or null (n=11 and n=7), suggesting that sanctions may not 
promote job stability or quality. Evidence for these measures was dominated by outcomes from non-
experimental studies (n=17; 68%), with no experimental studies reporting measures of job stability 
or quality. The direction of effects was quite inconsistent with too few to make useful comparisons 
on the basis of study design.  
 
Negative or null job stability effects were reported mainly by Continental European studies with 
outcomes measured mostly in the medium-term, whereas similar results for job quality were 
reported mostly in the longer-term by three US studies and two Continental European studies. For 
both outcomes, most studies relied on survival modelling techniques (n=7), whereas two German 
studies applied matching techniques (Hofman, 2012 [16]; Hohenleitner and Hillmann, 2019b [18]). 
Although largely in the short-term, negative or no impacts were also exhibited by quasi-
experimental studies for European countries, mostly relying on instrumental variables (National 
Audit Office, 2016 [61]; Arni and Schiprowki, 2019 [54]). 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
 
Entry into non-employment or economic inactivity 
Adverse labour market impacts were also reported in terms of a significant increase in transitions to 
either non-employment or economic inactivity. These were mostly measured through exits from 
benefits or transitions to destinations other than benefit receipt or gainful employment. An increase 
in the risks of exit to non-employment or inactivity was recorded for 26 (72%) out of a total of 36 
outcomes. For the remaining 10 outcomes (28%), no effect was reported. Only three long-term non-
employment or inactivity outcomes were reported, with inconsistent findings.  
 
Most studies reporting a positive association with non-employment/inactivity outcomes were from 
Continental European countries and relied on either survival modelling or a timing-of-events 
approach (n=14; 70%). Note that, in many of these countries, sanctioned unemployment insurance 
claimants would have access to second-tier social assistance benefits. The only exception was a UK 
study (Reeves, 2017 [37]) which used fixed effects models applied to area-level data to investigate 
the impact of a recent reform of the UK Job Seekers’ Allowance regime. Four outcomes were 
reported from three European studies using matching techniques (Lissinburgh (2017, [28]) for the 
UK; Hofmann (2012, [16]) and Hohenleitner and Hillmann (2019a, [17]) for Germany). Using quasi-
experimental designs, positive impacts of sanctions on non-employment or economic inactivity were 
found for five measures, as reported by three European studies using instrumental variables 
(Bookmann et al. (2014, [55]) for Germany; National Audit Office (2016, [61]) for the UK; Arni and 
Schiprowki (2019, [54]) for Switzerland). One descriptive study (Ovwigho et al., 2011 [33]) and one 
experimental study (Olson et al., 1997 [66]) reported no change within the US context, while a quasi-
experimental study (Arni and Schiprowki, 2016 [53]) reported an increase in long-term inactivity 
within a Swiss context. 
 
Benefit receipt 
Overall, there were twenty-one outcomes measured for benefit receipt which referred to either re-
entry to benefits, the amount of benefit received, or the number of people claiming benefits. Among 
these, more than half (53%; n=11) reported a significant decrease following an imposition of a 
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sanction, while no statistically significant effects were reported by one third (n=7) and a significant 
increase was reported by just three studies (14%). Six long-term benefit receipt outcomes were 
reported by non-experimental studies. Of these, there was no effect in three cases, a reduction in 
two, and an increase in one. 
 
Studies from two Nordic countries, applying survival modelling (Diop-Christensen (2015, [10]) for 
Denmark) and a timing-of-events approach (Busk (2016, [7]) for Finland) generated a positive 
association and no effect, respectively. Two positive and two negative impacts were reported for 
outcomes from quasi-experimental studies (n=4), while there was no effect on three outcomes from 
US studies based on a random assignment exercises and a negative effect in a further four. Within 
this group, one study (Scrivener and Walter, 2001 [68]) reported two negative and one null effect. 
 
Earnings and income 
We identified 28 outcomes reporting effects on earnings and/or income. A large share of these 
reported either a significant reduction (n=12; 43%) or no effects (n=11; 39%) while a significant 
increase was reported by five studies (18%). Non-experimental designs predominantly showed a 
reduction or no change in income (n=9 and n=7 out of 17). The negative results employed 
descriptive analyses (n=3), probit regression (n=1), survival or timing-of-events models (n=3) and 
propensity score matching (n=2). The quasi-experimental or experimental studies had slightly less 
negative results (n=3 out of 11). Notably, although only six earnings-related outcomes were reported 
by experimental studies from the US context, four of these found a positive association with 
sanctions, while two found no effect. Although a large majority of effects were negative (n=12) or 
null (n=11), indicating that sanctions are associated with a reduction or no change in earnings or 
income, most of the findings from experimental studies suggested a positive impact. 
 
Wider outcomes 
Fewer studies reported results on wider outcomes measures (n=90) (Table 3 and Figure 4, panel a). 
Almost all use non-experimental methods (n=78) and all stem from English-speaking countries, such 
as the US, UK and Australia. A large proportion of studies reported an increase in both material 
hardship, such as financial distress and food insecurity, and adverse health outcomes for adults and 
children. A significant association was also shown with adverse child outcomes, such as child 
maltreatment, poorer child well-being and educational outcomes. While the results on child 
maltreatment were corroborated by one quasi-experimental study, for child well-being there were 
some inconsistencies across study designs. A significant increase in survival crime was also reported 
by one quasi-experimental study. 
 
Material hardship 
Material hardship was assessed though measures such as food insecurity, inability to pay rent or 
utility bills, borrowing and debt problems. Positive associations with material hardship were 
observed for 17 outcomes (48%), while 16 outcomes reported no significant associations (46%); for 
only two outcomes there was a negative association or improvement in welfare (6%). All the 
evidence on material hardship hinges on non-experimental designs, mostly relying on descriptive 
and standard regression techniques. Two exceptions employed fixed effects models: a study by 
Reichman et al. (2005 [87]) for the US which found a positive relationship with food poverty and 
utility cut-offs, and a study by Loopstra et al. (2018 [82]) for the UK which found a positive 
relationship with food bank use. 
 
All 35 studies reporting outcomes on material hardship were from English-speaking countries, with 
US covering the vast majority, UK contributing two studies and Australia one. A significant increase 
in food insecurity and poverty was reported by 8 studies out of 15 (53%), with just one US study 
based on state-level aggregated data reporting a significant reduction in poverty rates (Rodgers et 
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al., 2006 [88]). A significant increase in difficulties in paying bills and the experience of utility cut-offs 
was reported by 6 studies out of 9 (67%). In addition, 3 out of 5 studies (60%) displayed a significant 
increase in issues related to health insurance coverage for the adult or parent, while no associations 
were reported for children by one study (Lindhorst and Mancoske, 2006 [26]). Adverse schooling 
outcomes were reported for children in a study by Oggins and Fleming (2001, [32]). For problems 
concerning both borrowing and debt, and housing-related problems, including homelessness and 
eviction, the majority of the studies reported no significant associations with the imposition of 
sanctions (75%, 3 out of 4 studies, and 67%, 4 out of 6 studies, respectively). 
 
Health problems and health insurance status 
Health problems were largely quantified using self-reported measures relating to mental and 
physical health which referred to either adults/parents or children. In the case of children, these 
were reported by one of the parents. Other measures included indicators related to hospitalisation 
and doctor consultations (Cook et al., 2002 [72]; Baltagi and Yen, 2016 [69]).  
 
A significant increase in health problems was shown for 6 out of 12 measures. Of the remainder, five 
reported no statistically significant associations, while one reported a significant negative 
association. While a significant reduction in health insurance coverage was reported for two out of 
six outcomes (33%), null associations were reported for four. The first two came from the study by 
Moffitt (2000 [29]), while the latter four were from Chavkin et al. (2000 [8]). These results are in line 
with those on health insurance coverage recorded as part of material hardship (see section above). 
Across the board, most studies were from the US, except for one Australian study by Eardley (2006 
[75]). The majority applied either standard regression or fixed/random effects models. 
 
Child outcomes: well-being, maltreatment and education 
There are mixed results for the effects of sanctions on child well-being. We identified three US 
studies reporting eight measures relating to child well-being (Chase-Lansdale et al., 2002 [71]; 
Lohman et al., 2004 [81]; Wang, 2015 [93]). These generally included measures regarding cognitive 
achievement and behavioural problems. Most measures (n=6; 75%) showed no sanction effects for 
child well-being, while a significant increase was found for behavioural problems (n=1) and a 
significant reduction for cognitive achievement (n=1). These two results both appeared in the study 
by Lohman et al. (2004 [81]), which was based on descriptive analyses, similarly to Chase-Lansdale et 
al. (2002 [71]). Adopting a quasi-experimental design, the study by Wang (2015 [93]) combined 
propensity score matching with a difference-in-differences modelling approach. The author used a 
composite outcome measure by combining multiple items, including cognitive development, family’s 
interactions and stress, and educational outcomes. For each of these measures a nil impact was 
shown for the imposition of sanctions. 
 
We identified a total of 11 measures on child maltreatment, including (indicated or substantiated) 
reports of abuse or neglect as well as foster-care placement. For the majority of the measures, no 
statistically significant effects were found (n=6; 55%), while a significant increase (worsening) was 
reported for the remaining measures. However, all the studies providing evidence of the adverse 
effects of sanctions on child maltreatment consistently reported a significant increase in cases of 
child neglect or maltreatment (Fein and Lee, 2003 [94]; Ovwigho et al., 2003 [84]; Paxson and 
Waldfogel, 2003 [85]; Slack et al., 2007 [90]). For foster-care placement, results were less clear with 
Paxson and Waldfogel’s non-experimental study (2003 [85]) reporting a statistically positive effect 
whilst Fein and Lee’s experimental study (2003 [94]) recorded a null effect. All the non-experimental 
studies were based on survival modelling applications. 
 
The evidence base on children’s educational outcomes is rather scant, resting on a single non-
experimental study by Larson et al. (2011 [79]) using descriptive analyses. The study reported a 
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negative association between the imposition of sanctions and school attendance rate, while no 
effect was reported for enrolment disruptions. Mixed results were also reported for children’s 
educational outcomes, as part of material hardship as noted above. 
 
Demographic outcomes 
Demographic outcomes were quantified by measures such as entry into marriage or cohabitation, 
non-marital childbearing or female household headship, and living arrangements of both adults and 
children. We identified a total of ten demographic outcomes, mostly reporting no statistically 
significant associations with the imposition of sanctions. Consistent findings were reported across 
non- and quasi-experimental studies, six of which applied survival models including fixed effects, 
while one used a difference-in-differences model. The only exception within the non-experimental 
group was a UK study by Reeves and Loopstra (2017 [86]) applying a fixed effects model on area-
level data and reporting a significant positive association with areas with a higher proportion of lone 
parents.  
 
Vulnerable status, crime, compliance and other outcomes 
 
We identified one study from the UK which applied fixed-effects models and found a significant 
positive relationship between sanctions and vulnerable status, measured through the proportion of 
unemployment benefit claimants with a disability (Reeves and Loopstra, 2017 [86]). Another UK 
study, relying on a difference-in-differences model, reported a significant positive impact of 
sanctions on survival crime rates but a nil impact on violent crime rates (Machin and Marie, 2006 
[92]). A significant increase in compliance with requirements and other outcomes, namely social 
relationship problems and risk-taking behaviour, was reported by a non-experimental study for 




Summary of the results 
Our scoping review describes the evidence base relating to the impact of benefit sanctions on both 
labour market and wider outcomes. The review makes an original contribution through its 
application of comprehensive searching, screening and data extraction processes to the 
international quantitative research evidence on labour market and wider outcomes. We are not 
aware of any previous attempt to systematically identify and synthesise the latter literature. The 
review relies on a rigorous methodology to provide transparency and reduce the potential for 
reviewer selection to bias findings. We do not attempt a systematic review or meta-analysis of 
results at this stage but look at where the preponderance of the evidence lies. However, in our 
narrative summary, we do examine the study designs employed using an extended hierarchy to 
assess the robustness of the evidence base.  
 
Our scoping review identified 94 studies providing novel quantitative evidence on the labour market 
and/or wider impacts of sanctions which met our inclusion criteria. From these, we identified 253 
outcome measures, of which nearly two thirds related to labour market outcomes while one third 
covered wider outcomes. The literature on labour market outcomes was not only larger but also had 
a higher proportion of studies employing research designs which are better suited to supporting 
causal claims. In general, however, studies employing quasi-experimental or experimental methods 
did not diverge substantially in their findings from those employing non-experimental methods.  
 
Labour market studies produced evidence of a positive impact of sanctions on employment 
outcomes. This is consistent with the findings from existing reviews (e.g. Griggs and Evans, 2010; 
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McVicar, 2020). Our review highlighted that sanctions were associated with a range of adverse 
impacts in terms of worsening job quality and stability in the longer term, along with higher rates of 
exits to non-employment or economic inactivity, and more rapid returns to benefit claiming. Null or 
negative impacts were shown for earnings or income measures. 
 
The evidence base on wider outcomes was not only considerably smaller but also dominated by non-
experimental studies. The studies reported a wide range of negative impacts. The imposition of 
sanctions was associated with an increase in material hardship, including food deprivation and the 
experience of financial hardships. Sanctions were also associated with worse physical and mental 
health and decreased access to healthcare insurance. For outcomes related to children, there was 
some evidence that sanctions were associated with an increase in child maltreatment as well as 
behavioural problems and poorer cognitive development. There were no significant associations 
between sanctions and demographic outcomes, such as non-marital childbearing or living 
arrangements for adults and children. There was some evidence of increases in crime and worsening 
child education for a small number of studies.  
 
Results in context 
All studies reporting wider outcomes originated from English-speaking countries, with the US 
covering a large proportion, while labour market studies included a significant share from 
Continental and Nordic European countries. This geographical divide also reflects heterogenous 
policy intervention programmes and different degrees of severity of the sanctioning regimes across 
the regions, with US welfare-to-work programmes targeting low-income families and lone parents, 
while sanctioning among the included European studies is directed towards unemployed claimants 
in receipt of either unemployment insurance or unemployment assistance benefits. While the 
sanctioning regime of the former, along with that of the UK, features a safety net with a single tier, 
several European countries present an additional tier of the safety net in the form of means-tested 
social assistance (e.g. Esser et al., 2013); this may have implications for the nature of the impacts 
that we observe. Further investigation of the role played by the context in which sanction regimes 




In contrast to an increasing number of studies focussing on labour market outcomes, we observed a 
reduction in the evidence base on wider outcomes over time. While the former is increasingly based 
on quasi-experimental or experimental designs, the latter uses predominantly non-experimental 
designs. This highlights an important gap in the literature on wider outcomes, as the evidence base 
may be affected by issues concerning unobserved confounding which limit the causal inferences that 
can be drawn. Concerning the wider impacts of benefit sanctions, our review revealed some areas 
which remain under-investigated. One area concerns the housing impacts of benefit sanctions, in 
terms of rent arrears, eviction and homelessness. A recent UK study by Hardie (2020), examining the 
effects of the recently implemented Universal Credit programme (which merges pre-existing means-
tested working-age benefits), found that benefit conditionality and sanctioning were associated with 
increased landlord repossession rates. An additional area where we found either inconsistent or 
limited evidence concerns child well-being, including educational and health outcomes. A recent 
review on the effects of social security reforms on mental health in high-income countries has 
reached similar conclusions concerning child health outcomes and acknowledged that these have 
important implications for health, education and employment opportunities of children as they 




Limitations and future research directions 
There are two main limitations that should be considered when interpreting the findings of this 
review. One limitation concerns the scope of the literature which is captured by the review. As it is 
common with other scoping reviews, this is highly dependent on the inclusion criteria established at 
the onset of the study. While the search strategy was designed to identify as many relevant studies 
as possible, we cannot be certain that all such studies were found. For example, by excluding studies 
not published in the English language or including only studies available at the time when the 
searches were completed, it is possible that we did not capture some relevant studies. In addition, in 
the econometrics literature, many studies are working papers which do not use consistent key words 
and are accessed via websites with basic search functions. Further, indexing in economics journals is 
not always optimal. We developed a comprehensive search strategy and hand searched many 
relevant repositories of working papers in an effort to overcome this limitation. 
 
A second limitation relates to the synthesis of the results from the studies reviewed. Although we 
extracted impact data for all reported outcomes, including any subgroups, time horizons of the 
results and exposure categories, in the context of a scoping review, it was not possible to encompass 
this level of detail. We used a vote counting approach based on direction and significance of effect 
to provide a summary of the impacts of sanctions. Vote counting has well recognised limitations, 
including lack of weighting for sample size and not accounting for effect magnitude or precision of 
estimates. However, in the context of a scoping review with a large number of heterogenous 
outcomes we feel that vote counting provides an accessible high-level summary of trends in the 
data.  
 
There is scope to extend the exercise undertaken for this scoping review to a full systematic review, 
including a critical appraisal of the evidence base, a detailed narrative synthesis and, if possible, a 
meta-analysis of the impacts. However, the latter is dependent on the degree of homogeneity of the 
outcome measures and related estimated parameters which may be difficult for the studies 
reporting wider outcomes. 
 
Policy implications 
While sanctions increase exits to employment in the short term, there is evidence of adverse 
impacts on job quality, job stability, earnings, and income. In addition, it appears that sanctions may 
increase exits to non-employment or inactivity. Evidence on wider impacts is predominantly drawn 
from studies with limited ability to support causal inference, indicating a crucial gap in the evidence 
base. Nonetheless, the high proportion of adverse impacts on measures of material hardship, health, 
and child outcomes is sufficient to give cause for concern and corroborates the evidence from 
numerous qualitative studies. Given the potential for harm, policy-makers should give serious 
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TABLE 1. Overview of the study design typology based on the studies included in the scoping review 
Study design type Description 
Issues for identification of 
causal effects 
 
Non-experimental study designs: 
 
1a. Descriptive analysis, Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS), logistic or 
probit regression 
Bivariate analyses and 
multivariable regression models 
relying on standard covariate 
adjustment to control for 
potential confounders 
 
Omission of unobserved 
confounders which correlate with 
sanction risks and relevant 
outcomes may bias estimations of 
sanction effects.  
 
1b. Survival models, fixed and 
random effects models 
 
More complex models which may 
control for some unmeasured 
confounding along with that due 
to covariates.  
 
Issues of residual confounding 
and reverse causation 
(endogeneity) may remain 
1c. Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM) 
Using selection on observables to 
estimate the probability of 
exposure or treatment 
conditioned on measured 
confounders 
 
Potential issues of residual and 
unmeasured confounding 
 
Quasi-experimental study designs: 
 
2. Difference-in-differences (DiD), 
Interrupted Time Series (ITS), 
Regression Discontinuity (RD), 
Instrumental Variables (IV) 
Using exogenous variation 
occurring ‘naturally’ in the data to 
estimate causal effect 
Rely on strong assumptions (e.g. 
time-invariant confounding, 
continuity of the assignment 
variable continuity, association of 
the instrument with the outcome 
exclusively through the treatment 
variable) which are difficult to test 
although various analyses may 
give additional support. Some 




Experimental study designs: 
 
3. Random assignment, 
Randomised Controlled Trial 
(RCT) 
Exploit random assignment of 
individuals to a treatment and a 
control group to effectively 
account for sources of selection 
bias 
Considered as the gold standard 
for the identification of causal 
effects 





TABLE 2. Overview of the studies for labour market and wider outcomes 






Study characteristics n % n % n % 
Alla 103 100 68 66.0 35 34.0 
Period covered by studyb       
1980s 3 2.9 1 1.5 2 5.7 
1990s 60 58.3 36 52.9 24 68.6 
2000s 34 33.0 26 38.2 8 22.9 
2010s 6 5.8 5 7.4 1 2.8 
Publication period       
1990s 2 1.9 2 2.9 - - 
2000s 59 57.3 32 47.1 27 77.1 
2010s 42 40.8 34 50.0 8 22.9 
Selected countries/regions 
      
USA 65 63.1 35 51.5 30 85.7 
Australia 1 1.0 - - 1 2.9 
UK 8 7.7 4 5.9 4 11.4 
Continental Europe 22 21.4 22 32.3 - - 
Nordic countries 7 6.8 7 10.3 - - 
Target populationc 
      
Low-income families/ 
lone parents  
66 63.5 36 52.2 30 85.7 
Unemployed people 37 35.5 32 46.4 5 14.3 
People with a disability 1 1.0 1 1.4 - - 
Type of programmec 
      
TANF/AFDC benefitsd 64 61.5 34 49.3 30 85.7 
Unemployment insurance 24 23.1 20 29.0 4 11.4 
Unemployment assistance 15 14.4 14 20.3 1 2.9 
Disability benefits 1 1.0 1 1.4 - - 
Sanction effecte       
Take-up 3 2.9 3 4.4 - - 
Threat 9 8.7 8 11.8 1 2.9 
Warning 1 1.0 1 1.5 - - 
Imposed 83 80.6 50 73.5 33 94.2 
Multiple 5 4.9 4 5.9 1 2.9 
Not known 2 1.9 2 2.9 - - 
Exposuref       
Full sanctions 40 38.8 29 42.7 11 31.4 
Partial sanctions 18 17.5 16 23.5 2 5.7 
Full or partial sanctions 39 37.9 17 25.0 22 62.9 
Other 6 5.8 6 8.8 - - 
Type of sanction indicator       
Individual-level 69 67.0 51 75.0 18 51.4 
Area-level 34 33.0 17 25.0 17 48.6 
Unit of analysis       
Individual-level 90 87.4 62 91.2 28 80.0 
Area-level 13 12.6 6 8.8 7 20.0 
Type of data 
      
Administrative data 48 46.6 39 57.4 9 25.7 
Survey data 28 27.2 13 19.1 15 42.8 
Linked admin-survey data 23 22.3 13 19.1 10 28.6 
Other 4 3.9 3 4.4 1 2.9 
Note: a The number in each column exceed the number of studies in the analytical sample (n=94) due to 9 publications reporting both 
labour market and wider outcomes; b Study period refers to the onset of the period covered by a study when this encompasses more than 
one decade; c The information for ‘Target population’ and ‘Type of programme’ refers to n=104 due to a study reporting outcomes for two 
target populations exposed to two policy programmes (National Audit Office, 2016 [61]); d TANF is defined as ‘Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Family’, means-tested assistance benefits introduced by the US Federal Government in 1996 to replace the prior grant programme 
‘Aid to Families with Dependent Children’ (AFDC);e A definition of sanction effect is provided in section 3; f In the US, full sanctions also 
include full-family sanctions imposed to low-income/lone-parent households in receipt of TANF benefits for work-related non-compliance 
reported by the head of the household or other adult members.
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TABLE 3. Summary of resultsa for labour market and wider outcomes by main study design 
 Non-experimental design  Quasi-experimental design  Experimental design 
 Increaseb No effectb,c Decreaseb  Increaseb No effectb,c Decreaseb  Increaseb No effectb,c Decreaseb 
Study characteristics n % n % n % 
 
n % n % n % 
 
n % n % n % Tot (n)
All 74 29.0 75 30.0 37 14.5  15 5.9 18 7.1 9 3.6  13 5.1 8 3.2 4 1.6 253 
Panel (a): Labour market outcomes 
Employment 14 31.8 11 25.0 5 11.3  3 6.8 2 4.6 2 4.6  7 15.9 - - - - 44 
Job stability 3 21.4 1 7.2 4 28.5  3 21.4 2 14.3 1 7.2  - - - - - - 14 
Job quality 1 9.1 3 27.3 5 45.4  - - 1 9.1 1 9.1  - - - - - - 11 
Non-employment/ 
inactivity 
20 55.6 7 19.4 - - 5 13.9 3 8.3 - - 1 2.8 - - - - 36 
Long-term non-em-
ployment/inequality 
- - 1 33.3 - - 
 
1 33.3 - - - - 
 
- - 1 33.3 - - 3 
Benefit receipt 1 4.8 4 19.0 5 23.9  2 9.5 - - 2 9.5  - - 3 14.3 4 19.0 21 
Long-term benefit 
receipt 
1 16.7 3 50.0 2 33.3 
 
- - - - - - 
 
- - - - - - 6 
Earnings/income 1 3.6 7 25.0 9 32.2  - - 2 7.1 3 10.7  4 14.3 2 7.1 - - 28 
Total 41 25.1 37 22.7 30 18.4  14 8.6 10 6.1 9 5.5  12 7.4 6 3.7 4 2.5 163 
                      
Panel (b): Wider outcomes 
Material hardship 17 48.6 16 45.7 2 5.7  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 35 
Health problems   6 50.0 5 41.7 1 8.3  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 12 
Health insurance - - 4 66.7 2 33.3  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 6 
Child well-being 1 12.5 2 25.0 1 12.5  - - 4 50.0 - -  - - - - - - 8 
Child maltreatment 4 36.4 4 36.4 - -  - - - - - -  1 9.1 2 18.1 - - 11 
Child education - - 1 50.0 1 50.0  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 2 
Demographic 
outcomes 
1 10.0 6 60.0 - - - - 3 30.0 - - - - - - - - 10 
Vulnerable status 1 100 - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 1 
Crime - - - - - -  1 50 1 50.0 - -  - - - - - - 2 
Compliance 1 100 - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 1 
Other 2 100 - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - 2 
Total 33 36.7 38 42.2 7 7.8  1 1.1 8 8.9 - -  1 1.1 2 2.2 - - 90 
Note: a Information is reported at the lowest level of aggregation, for outcome measures (n=253); b The significance level for the reported results is p<0.05; to aid interpretation of the 
direction of results, we report row percentages referring to total observations for each outcome. When significant, the sign of the estimated parameter for some outcome measures are 
inverted for ease of interpretation. For example, for measures concerning job stability, if the study reports a significant increase in the risk of entry into short-term jobs, then this is reported 
















































Figure 1. Flow chart representing the study selection process 
 
Records identified through 
database searching 































Additional records identified 
through other sources 
(n = 404) 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n = 7573) 
Records screened 
(title and abstract) 
(n = 7573) 
Records excluded 
Out of scope (n = 6387) 
Full-text articles assessed 
for eligibility 
(n = 1186) 
Full-text studies excluded 
(n = 1092): 
 
o Not sanctions (n = 603) 
o Study design (n = 197) 
o No access (n = 28) 
o Out of scope (n = 26) 
o Duplicate (n = 10) 
o Multiple interventions (n=153) 
o Reviews (n=75) 
Studies included in the 
analytical sample (n = 94) 
 
o Labour market outcomes only (n = 59) 
o Wider outcomes only (n=26) 
o Labour market and wider outcomes (n=9) 
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Figure 2. Representation of outcomes and selected measures for studies on labour market and wider outcomes 





Figure 3. Study design typology by labour market and wider outcome measures 
Note: Frequencies are reported at the lowest level of aggregation, namely for outcome measures (n=253). 
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Figure 4. Direction of results by type of labour market and wider outcome 
Note: Frequencies are reported at the lowest level of aggregation, namely for outcome measures (n=253) 
 





















Panel (a): Labour market outcomes
Number of outcome measures
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